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SPEECH
DIRECTORY:
Background on RDC
Investment Parameters
Case Study: Financing the Nacala Corridor
Structural Trends in African Privatizations
Case Study: Financing Ferrovias Guatemala
Structural Trends in Central America
Conclusions
Nacala Corridor Inspection Trip
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My agenda will be as follows:
a brief background on Railroad Development Corporation (RDC);
then we’ll talk about the Nacala Corridor with a lot of detail and
compare that with Guatemala, which is another example of a rail
concession; and finally draw some conclusions.
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Background
on RDC
RDC
is a small company, privately held and based in Pittsburgh. We describe
our business as Emerging Corridors in Emerging Markets, meaning
that RDC does not just get involved with railways, but railways in
conjunction with ports such as on the Nacala Corridor or, in the case of
Guatemala, trying to develop the right-of-way for alternative uses like
electricity distribution and other types of businesses. I would also
like to highlight that everything RDC does is the result of Joint
Ventures.
In each of our businesses we have partners; we bring skills to
the mix that complement our partners’ skills. So today I am not just
discussing RDC, but the results of RDC with our partners.
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Table
A
shows a broad overview, listing the countries and railways in which we
are involved. There is a broad mix from the Iowa Interstate Railroad in
the USA hauling 8.5 million tons in contrast to Guatemala which hauls
0.16 million tons. Interestingly enough, our biggest business is in
Estonia in Europe where the railway annually hauls 42 million tons. I
would like to add that RDC is the smallest shareholder in Estonian
Railways. Generally speaking, the better the deal, everybody wants in,
so our participation is relatively small.
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Table
A
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| Country |
Entity |
Length (km) |
Employees |
Tons Y. 2004
(in millions) |
| USA |
Iowa Interstate |
1,005 |
181 |
8.5 |
| Argentina |
ALL Central |
5,350 |
1,012 |
3.4 |
| Argentina |
ALL Mesopotamica |
2,740 |
313 |
1.4 |
| Guatemala |
Ferrovias Guatemala |
322 |
115 |
0.16 |
| Peru |
Ferrocarril Central Andino |
591 |
111 |
1.7 |
| Malawi |
Central East Africa Railways |
797 |
487 |
0.3 |
| Estonia |
Eesti
Raudtee |
693 |
2,536 |
42.1 |
| Mozambique |
Nacala
Corridor |
872 |
227
Rail |
0.3 |
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The accomplishment that I am most proud of is that our railroad in the
USA, the Iowa Interstate, won the Gold Harriman Award for Safety. I know
that sometimes there is the tendency to think that capitalism equals
cutting corners, but I can assure you that at RDC this is a matter of
personal pride; we have built a safety culture. In the year 2003 we had
No Injuries at all for the entire year on the Iowa Interstate, resulting
in the Gold Award. This is the type of culture that we hope to spread to
some of our other railways and we are in fact being successful in this. |
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RDC Investment Parameters |
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Concerning investments, RDC has learned over the years that there are
several critical factors, especially involving railway concessions, that
make or break whether one should be investing in a particular country.
In descending priority they are:
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-
A
committed seller.
This means a government that is serious about concessioning and not
just going through the motions because someone has been awarded a
consulting contract to float the idea of concessioning; there are
plenty of those out there! We pride ourselves on our ability to
avoid wasting our time in countries that are not serious.
-
Rational
competition among bidders.
As discussed yesterday, if we see the national railways of
India or South Africa bidding against us, I confess to you that I do
not have as much money as the Treasury of South Africa nor the
Treasury of India.
So we are not likely to be serious competitors; we tend to
choose our battles; and we look at the competition before we take a
serious look.
-
It
is very important to have local partners.
We know a lot about railways but we don’t know anything
about Africa, Guatemala or Peru.
Many of the things that we have been able to achieve have not
been a result of what we’ve done, but rather the result of whom
we’ve chosen to be affiliated with. Our local partners carry a lot
of the load in most situations.
-
Yes,
railway skills are important.
At this point we have amassed quite a body of experience in
some of the most difficult railways in the world, and we do bring
value to the table in this regard.
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CASE
STUDY: Financing the Nacala Corridor |
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Let’s discuss the Nacala Corridor as a case study. In quite simple
terms the Nacala Corridor consists of the Nacala Port in Mozambique, the
Nacala Railway in Mozambique, and the railway in Malawi. For us this
process began in 1996, beginning with the negotiation of a concession on
the Mozambique side. Malawi subsequently decided that they needed to be
proactive, and as a result they went ahead and concessioned Malawi
Railways.
This corridor was thus not concessioned as a package; each
country did their own thing. We took it on faith that eventually we
would be able to put the pieces together, but of course didn’t expect
that it would take 5 years!
The
Malawi concession occurred in 1999, but unfortunately we ended up with
half of a railway for quite some time. We did not have operational or
financial involvement on the Mozambique side, so we were effectively
competing in Malawi with one hand tied behind our back. Compounding this
was the cyclone in 2003 which took out, among other things, a bridge and
because we did not have financing, there were no resources to fix the
bridge. Finally, we did close on the Mozambique side in 2005, but by
that time they were down to 4 locomotives!
Can you imagine running half of a railway with 4 locomotives?
This was the legacy of the delays of incomplete financing and
many other factors. But the fact is that we took over this operation
with only 4 locomotives.
The financial package consisted of 25% private equity (from RDC and our
partners); 75% debt came from OPIC (U.S. Overseas Private Investment
Corp.) after a 5-year search for financing and we are very much grateful
to them.
Also in the interim there was donor support due to the famine in
addition to the cyclone; donors got involved with the Rivi Rivi Bridge
project. But the most important thing is that in neither Malawi nor
Mozambique did we go back to their governments to renegotiate the deal
because we did not project or structure properly. Our standard is to
honor our commitments. It took a long time, longer than it should have;
but we did come through and honor our original commitment to both
governments.
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Photo
1 |
Back
to the donor role; Photo
1 is the nearly completed bridge at Rivi Rivi in February
2005 whose predecessor was taken out by Cyclone Delphina in 2003. In
this particular case there was a mix of financing that went into this
project, ranging from the railway company to USAID, the UK fund DFID and
even the Malawi Army. Recall that this morning we heard the example of
Gabon; when it’s everybody’s problem, everyone has to work on it.
This project is one of the things that happened while we were waiting
for the financing to close.
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