CONFESSIONS OF A MONOPOLIST: 
Investment in, and Management of, the Vertically Integrated Railway 
 
   
   
     

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  SPEECH DIRECTORY:

BACKGROUND ON RDC

USA
Argentina
Guatemala
Peru
Malawi / Mozambique
Estonia

TYPICAL CHALLENGES

Operational
Safety
Cultural
Case Study: Guatemala
Financial
Macro

STRUCTURAL & FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

Q & A SESSION
 

Financial Challenges – Squatters

The other interesting aspect is that we have been declared not a solution, but a problem by the multi-laterals that finance infrastructure in developing countries. The reason is that when the train started running, the squatters had to leave — which meant that we were the problem. We have not been able to obtain financing for this project because of the problems that we have created by running trains.  I’m sure all in this audience share the arrogance that our business is good for the country and the environment, but not everyone shares that view.  This is a nice segue into what I would like to say about financial challenges and some of the structural challenges unique to this business.

Macro Challenges

At the macro level it is extremely difficult to finance railways in developing countries. Regulation is sometimes a factor as well as politics.  But to be quite honest, politics are not nearly as much of a factor in poor countries as in rich countries; usually poor countries have to focus more on economics if only because they have no choice.

 
     

Structural & Financial Considerations

Now I’d like to comment on some structural and financial considerations that are based on my experience as someone who has been involved on a number of continents — even Europe, in the case of Estonia. I hope these comments in particular will be interesting to this group; just keep mind that these come from a foreigner with a different perspective.


 
     

Table A compares the railway environment from continent to continent and it is interesting how South America and Southern Africa fit in. I would encourage you to make the major comparison between North America and Europe. In particular, note the “Orientation” line; I believe that North American railways are freight oriented, whereas European railways are passenger oriented. I think it is quite a substantial difference and that is why my comments need to be taken in context in terms of the conclusions that I will draw.

 

 

  

 

Table A - Environment

 
     

 

North
America
South
America
Europe Southern
Africa
Distances Long Medium Short Medium
Traffic Patterns Concentrated Concentrated Fragmented Concentrated
Breaks of Gauge 0 Many 1 0
Capacity Constraints Line Capacity Ports Clearances Track
Orientation Freight Freight Passenger Freight
Business Languages 3 2 Many 2
Frontiers 2 Many Many Many
Ownership Private Private Public Public

 

     


The other comparison is distance. North America is big, it’s a few countries, a few languages; compare that with Europe’s relatively short distances, different languages, etc. Therefore, the environment is substantially different than in North America.

 

     

Most importantly, the reasons for restructuring are substantially different between North America and Europe (Table B). I made the earlier comment that when I worked at the Rock Island Railroad, 25% of the US rail mileage was in bankruptcy. This is very much a case of the government saying that you have to fix your own problems and we’ll give you the freedom to go out of business; there is no money — you need to fix your own problems. Thus, deregulation was the result – the North American solution. In contrast, as I see Europe, there is a more substantial political component that’s driving the process; in particular, note that I put “de-monopolization” as a reason for restructuring. This is my personal opinion.


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Table B - Restructuring Origins

 

     

 

North
America
South
America
Europe Southern
Africa

Economic:

Bankruptcies X      
Lack of Investment X X   X
Operating Losses   X X X

Political:

Privatization Thrust   X   X
De-Monopolization     X  

 

     


The driving force (Table C) in North America is deregulation, driven by economics; Europe is de-monopolization, driven by politics. But despite there being political components in both small developing countries and in big richer countries, I would like to argue that the driving force, regardless of the political intent, is economics and will always be economics.


 

      Table C - Strategies

 

     

 

North
America
South
America
Europe Southern
Africa
PRIMARY Deregulation Privatization De-monopolization Increased Trade
SECONDARY Labor Reform Labor Reform Privatization Privatization
 
     
For numerous examples (Table D) as to why this is the case, look at the comparison of Exclusive Franchises, which is what we have in North and South America and Africa, with the Open Access environment that is being promoted through Europe. One of the key things to consider, at least from a financial perspective, is the value of the business – is the business worth anything?

 
      Table D - Market Force Results  
     

Financial Markets

EXCLUSIVE FRANCHISES OPEN ACCESS
Customer-specific investment in equipment and infrastructure
(USA, Latin America)
Customer-specific investment
in equipment (UK)
Consolidation of Brazilian and Argentine franchises; USA rail mergers Consolidation of UK trainload
freight businesses
High valuation of Mexican
businesses; Conrail
Low valuation of UK trainload freight businesses (even after consolidation)
Transportation Markets Increase in Latin American traffic Decline in European traffic
Return of southern Africa's
international flows
Growth in European river transportation (containers)
Renegotiation of franchise terms (Latin America) Capacity constraints on freight
growth (UK)
Penetration of eastern coal markets by western coal (USA) Cannibalization of EWS' coal flows by Freightliner (UK)
 
     
For example, consider the price paid for Conrail when it was vivisected a couple of years ago – half went to Norfolk Southern, half went to CSX. History has proven that the price was way too high and, in fact, I believe that those railways are now worth less than Conrail alone before they embarked upon that transaction. But the point is that at that time the financial markets believed that there was some significant value in it. Contrast this with the price that EWS was sold for when it was privatized  — and I think history has subsequently proven that it is worth even less. The primary reason is Open Access.

As I’ve said before, I read Modern Railways and it’s the basis for my forming opinions about a lot of things UK-related and Europe-related. As you flip through issue after issue, there’s always the picture of the named locomotive — “Her Majesty’s 18th Royal Fusiliers” or the like — hauling a coal movement that used to be hauled by one operator and is now being hauled by another one. Example after example describes traffic that was EWS’ and now it’s moved by Freightliner, etc.  As an outsider it seems to me that for the most part traditional movements like coal are being shifted from freight operator to freight operator as a result of low margin cannibalization. I think that has a lot to do with the financial results.

I see Max Steinkopf in the audience. Let me also say that I have read about GB Railways’ getting coal business and that was not a personal insult.

[Question from Mr. Steinkopf] What about Estonia?

We’ll talk about that later.

[Mr. Steinkopf] You’re saying that you’re the first; didn’t we buy it?

You’re right; we were the second into continental Europe (but first at a national level!). GB Railways was the first and I’m glad you’re here to keep me straight. And again, I apologize for not mentioning your own cannibalization of EWS’ business.


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      Conclusions

So let’s draw some overall conclusions, at least from a financial perspective (Table E). Politics are country-specific; but the primary focus of Open Access from my viewpoint is the political desire to de-monopolize, i.e. to take things apart. By contrast, the Exclusive Franchise model more or less left it alone and was based on the philosophy, “Look, you figure out the best way to serve the customer because the customer has trucks and we don’t really care if you exist or not; you must stand on your own.”

 

      Table E - Conclusions  
     

 

Open Access Exclusive Franchises
Primary Focus Political Customer
Secondary Focus Customer Investor
Operational Control Regulator Owner
Investment in Infrastructure No Yes
 
     
In the Open Access environment I would say that the customer benefits because at least with freight you have three or more companies, each going after every move and you can basically play them off against each other until there is no margin left. However, in the Exclusive Franchise environment, because the prime focus is on the customer the investor is rewarded because there is a margin to be earned if you can compete with trucks — as opposed to having other railways, with the same cost characteristics, competing for the same business.

Railway environments are diverse and certainly a lot of what we have experienced in the USA is not translatable; everything has to depend on local context.  I would also argue that structure is extremely critical. I spoke earlier about culture and local partners; railway skills are great but it is more important to be integrated with your partners and with the local economy. It is easier to screw up culturally than to screw up technically.

As we look at new investment opportunities — and I can tell you that there are not a lot out there — the first thing to look at is:  Is the government serious?  Or is privatization being promoted as a way of making the government look busy even though they are not really serious, or is there some other agenda?

If that test is passed, then the next question is:  Who will be your competition for this opportunity?  In the case of Africa if we see the national railways of France or the national railways of South Africa as our competitor, we are not likely to compete because I stand before you to tell you that we do not have as much money as the government of France or the government of South Africa. More to the point, we have not been able to convince a broad body of investors that this is a great business.

Third, it is very important to have local partners. We have been prevented from making some of our gravest potential errors by having our local partners interpret things in a different way in terms of culture, context and politics. Without local partners, you are unlikely to see us involved.

Last but not least, I still think railway skills are important and bring significant value to the business but they are less important than the other factors.

If you go to our website, www.RRDC.com, you’ll see a lot of what I’ve said in the Position Papers section and it would be very interesting to hear from you. We go out on a limb on many issues and if you’ve found my talk interesting, I think you’ll find the website interesting.

At this point, I would like to close by thanking you for the opportunity to speak to you and I hope that we will have a good question-and-answer session and that you will prove me wrong on at least some of the points that I made tonight. This is the London School of Economics and we’re all here to study railways. I consider myself a student of railways and I try to learn something everyday.

 
         
     

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