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A PARADOX
OF FINANCING: |
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SPEECH
DIRECTORY: Background on RDC USA Argentina Guatemala Peru Estonia Malawi / Mozambique Investment Parameters The Case for Privatization in Africa Case Study: Financing the Nacala Corridor Structural Trends in African Privatizations Conclusions Q & A Session |
Question-and-Answer
Session |
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In
Southern Africa there are many borders to cross between, for example,
South Africa and Tanzania. Why wouldn’t it be beneficial to have a
single operator on this corridor in order to provide a seamless service? |
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I
think that is an excellent point.
Please note that the Nacala Corridor is an isolated railway that
only goes between northern Mozambique and northern Malawi.
I think that you are exactly right to the extent that railways
should strive to offer seamless service, which is a competitive
advantage.
The only thing I would say is that in the USA we have 600
privately owned railways and they all successfully interchange traffic,
which suggests that at some point railway systems become too big.
At some point there is a strategic advantage to being bigger, but
at some point there is a strategic loss to being too big.
I think that probably the break point is where the customer
starts to see a disadvantage from having only one railway company to
deal with.
But you make a very good point and I think that’s an important
thing for the audience to reflect on. |
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I
feel that it is unfortunate that Mr. Posner used a public platform to
criticize Spoornet and I would like to ask several questions. First
question — if Spoornet were not doing what it is doing throughout
Africa, who would? After all, it has been discussed that there are very
few companies interested in rail privatization in Africa. |
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Let me answer that question
in two parts. First of all I believe that if Spoornet had done what it
said it was going to do 5 to 10 years ago, which is to take a serious
look at privatization, what you would probably have is more than one
railway company in South Africa. If
you look at what is happening with branch lines in South Africa,
Spoornet’s policy seems to be to close and scrap branch lines as
opposed to taking the chance that a private operator would succeed or
fail. This is also evident,
I believe, in the scrapping program in which, as I understand it,
freight wagons are not being sold even outside of South Africa; they are
only being allowed to be scrapped. |
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The
second question — was the Nacala Corridor put up for competitive
tender or was it open to everybody? |
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The
transaction in Mozambique began as a negotiated transaction well before
the privatization of Malawi Railways and that began in the mid 1990s.
But as that evolved, Malawi decided to embark on their own
privatization process. |
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The
third question was that you had criticized Spoornet for being a
parastatal but you also say that in the Nacala Corridor CFM is your
partner which is also a State enterprise. |
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I
think the difference is that CFM is basically holding the interests of
the State as a passive investor.
CFM is not the operator but there is an important need to provide
an economic interest to the people of Mozambique because we are, in
effect, using their assets as the basis for the management and operation
of the Nacala Corridor.
So to the extent that this becomes a gold mine we feel, and the
government of Mozambique felt, that it was important that the State have
a piece of the pie to the extent that there was a big payoff at the end.
This is a quite common model for privatization and is typical of
what has been done, for example, in Latin America. |
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Your
comments about Spoornet are unfortunate and I wish you had talked with
us before you made your remarks. We are moving ahead with privatization
in South Africa. And, outside of South Africa our participation is small
– no more than 20% in other countries. |
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Thank
you. I can only say that we do have lots of contacts with Spoornet over
the years and I hope that despite the comments that I have made, which I
hope are not construed as an attack on Spoornet but rather an
outsider’s opinion as to what an alternative strategy might be, that
we would be welcome at some point to participate on the operation of
light density lines in South Africa – for example, those that are
currently closed or in danger of being scrapped. |
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Isn’t
political risk a major factor in your investment policy? |
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I
would just like to reinforce one of the comments I made earlier which
may have been misinterpreted. Political risk is not as significant as
economic risk; that is the way we see the world. I think that if you
look at what has happened to RDC in other countries, for example, where
governments have changed. In two instances, the government changed and
the new government approached us and said, “You did a privatization
with the previous government so you must have done something illegal and
we are going to investigate.”
Our response in both cases was, “Fine; you are welcome to
investigate us.
In the meantime, we’re going to run the railroad.”
And in both cases, nothing else happened. |
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© 2003 Railroad Development Corporation
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