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Rail
Freight in New York City: |
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I
am truly honored to be here today as I know so many of you in the
audience. I would like to
give you my personal opinions about New York, which are also the
official positions of Railroad Development Corporation (RDC).
The agenda today is therefore to provide some background on RDC;
the U.S. short line industry; the overseas rail privatization industry;
case studies concerning overseas railways and New York City; and to draw
some conclusions. Let me first apologize for the extremely pretentious title of this presentation. I really tried to think up something that would be less pretentious. The idea is not to pompously shove any out-of-town opinions down anyone’s throat; but rather to raise people’s consciousness as to how rail freight in New York stacks up against the world on the other side of the Hudson River and also the world on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. |
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| Background on RDC | ||
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RDC
is a small company and one could say that we are probably among the
least successful of the short line companies, at least in the USA.
We are a privately held company and, while we have not been
particularly successful in the USA, we have found a niche for ourselves
in what we describe as Emerging Corridors in Emerging Markets – rail
privatizations with related businesses like ports, etc. in smaller
countries, and in particular developing countries. All of our businesses
are joint ventures, so nothing is “The RDC Show”. Our businesses
always include local participation.
We are a company with five and a half employees and we are active on four continents. Historically in the track department of the Class 1s, the rule of thumb was “one man, one mile.” In our case, it is 1.375 people per continent. Needless to say, we are not a highly centralized, control-oriented organization. And we are operating in some very interesting parts of the world – Argentina, Guatemala, Peru, Estonia, Malawi, and later on this year, Mozambique. |
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| USA Short Line Trends - Transactions | ||
| Let’s discuss the short line industry in the USA, and in particular why RDC has not been competitive in this business. Basically the competition in the railroad acquisition business is not trucks, but rather other buyers. Historically there have been dozens of bidders, all of whom are Innovative, Aggressive, Market-Driven, Successful Entrepreneurs, and the only question is, “Who is going to offer the highest price?” The result has been that acquisition prices have been very high even in today’s slightly depressed market. It has been for the most part a controlled auction process where the Class 1s or even downsizing short line companies have sold to the bidder who will pay the most cash for these deals. So while the labor costs may go down, they are substituted for by high debt costs in order to finance the acquisition price. We haven’t seen this practice changing in recent years; there has been some consolidation among the short line companies but there is always somebody who wants to enter the market for the first time with their vision of Innovative, Aggressive, Market-Driven, Successful Entrepreneurial Short Line Railroading. | ||
| USA Short Line Trends - Structural | ||
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Let’s
discuss where the short line industry is headed. From a structural
perspective we need to consider what short lines still bring to the
table, one of which is that short lines are far more effective at
marketing, especially to carload customers, than the Class 1s; the Class
1s will be the first ones to acknowledge this. The Class 1s have
virtually eliminated their marketing departments and rely heavily on
short lines for clusters of single carload traffic. Therefore the short
line industry is getting stronger due to consolidation among short line
companies i.e. RailAmerica, Genesee & Wyoming, etc. which bring
efficiencies to the table in terms of having shared office functions,
shared mechanical functions, etc. However, there are fundamental weaknesses in the short line industry. First of all, with labor shortages evolving it is no longer the case that Class 1s’ labor costs are higher than the short lines’. Short lines have to pay higher wages just to avoid having their employees hired back by the Class 1s. Secondly, mergers are not happening; therefore, the Class 1s do not need to rely on the short lines for political support. Finally, as the Class 1s have gotten bigger, any individual short line has gotten relatively smaller. Many of the Class 1s have doubled in size due to mergers, but if you are a single short line, it means you are half as important as you were before, relatively speaking. As stated before, the need for political support for mergers is past. There are still lots of people out there looking to buy, thus the competition is quite fierce. Interestingly, a recent trend is that while the public sector has historically been asked to finance the vision of short line entrepreneurs, now the public sector is being asked to finance the vision of Class 1s because now all of a sudden the Class 1s have found that they compete with trucks and that’s not fair. |
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| Overseas Trends - Structural | ||
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The
overseas business as we see it is basically rail privatization in Latin
America, Africa and the Former Soviet Union.
In the overseas business the competition is usually trucks as
opposed to other railroads. For
example, the Iowa Interstate is one of four railroads from Chicago and
Omaha; but in the countries in which we operate, we are the only
railroad. In Guatemala, we
are the railroad “monopoly”, but the only problem is that the
railroad was abandoned for three years; therefore, by definition there
were no customers to monopolize. But
at least in Guatemala we compete with trucks rather than other bidders. |
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© 2002 Railroad Development Corporation
All photographs are the property of RDC. Unauthorized duplication is
prohibited.